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Abstract 
A program package for the evaluation of fault trees and networks is 
described. The package, written in standard Fortran, is primarily de-
signed for use on a minicomputer. Special efforts were therefore made to 
minimize storage space requirements. 
The package contains programs for checking the fault tree input data 
for logical consistency and for providing various graphical representations 
of the tree. Furthermore, it contains programs for calculating minimal 
cut/path sets of the tree. A new technique automatically prunes the fault 
tree before the minimal set calculation. This pruning has in practice 
proved to considerably reduce computer time and storage space require-
ments. 
The probability program calculates the availability of the system at 
various time points from the minimal sets and from failure and repair data 
for the components. The network program finds all path sets in a directed 
or undirected network where both links and nodes may fail. The path sets 
represent the structure function of the network. The minimal cut sets are 
found by subjecting the structure function to the minimal set programs. 
The terminal availabilities can be calculated by using the probability pro-
gram. 
ISBN 87-550-041 8-0 
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INTRODUCTION 
Fault tree analysis (FTA) has become an indispensable tool for the 
reliability and safety analysis of complex systems. The basic concepts, 
techniques and applications are described in several papers and reports, 
«. g. O - 3). The state of the art is well represented by the contributions 
in (4) and (5). 
Apart from being a valuable graphical tool for communication, FTA 
allows a quantitative assessment of system reliability and availability. In 
this respect, its applications are limited to systems where time sequence 
is not important, or at least of so little significance that it can be neglected. 
For systems where time sequence i s essential, e.g. for systems where a 
passive standby i s switched in when the main system fails, other techniques 
such as cause-consequence analysis (6, 7) are more appropriate. Even for 
systems of this kind, FTA often plays an important role in solving a part of 
the problem. For the example above, a FTA could be used to obtain the 
distribution of time to failure for the main system or the unavailability of 
the standby. 
Computer programs for the analytic evaluation of fault trees are by now 
standard tools in the analysis of complex industrial systems. Many of the 
programs have been described in the literature (8-11). Most of them are 
written for large computers with ample in-core memory space. In this 
report we describe how procedures for fault tree evaluation can be im-
plemented on a minicomputer (an 8K PDP8 under 06/8). This is made 
possible by an new storage-space-saving implementation of the Fuss ell 
Vesely (12) algorithm for calculating minimal sets, and by the development 
of a technique for automatic pruning (or modularization) of fault trees. 
Although the programs have been developed for use on a minicomputer be-
cause of its advantages with regard to interactive analysis and flexibility in 
handling of data files, they can, with minor modifications, be implemented 
on any computer that accepts FORTRAN. 
The programs of the package fall into four main categories. In section 1 
we describe the format of the fault tree input data and the programs under 
the common label TREE. The first of these programs performs various 
error checks on the input data. The function of the other programs is to 
provide graphical fault tree representations from the input data so that the 
tree can be represented in a form in which it is most easily surveyed. 
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Section 2 is concerned with the second category of programs under the 
general heading CUT. The function of these programs is to make a top-
down calculation of minimal cut/path sets. One of the programs performs 
a pruning of the fault tree before it is subjected to the minimal set calcu-
lation. For most fault trees, the pruning will much reduce the number 
and/or the order of the minimal sets, thus making it possible to calculate . 
reliability parameters with an increased accuracy in a shorter time. For . 
the fault tree used as the main example in this report, pruning reduces the 
number of minimal cut sets from 11 934 to 48. 
Section 3 describes the UNA programs for reliability and availability 
calculations from the minimal sets and from failure, repair and test data 
for the components of the system. The programs accept components with 
either constant failure probabilities or exponentially distributed failure 
times. Repair times are either constant or exponentially distributed. 
Specifications of test intervals are also allowed. 
Throughout sections I - 3 the fault tree for the Dresden-3 AC emergency 
power system is used as an example. It is taken from the report by Garrick, 
Gekler, et al. (13) where it was used to demonstrate a Monte Carlo code. 
Vesely (14) also used it. As a second example of a calculation of minimal 
cut sets, we use the fault tree for the High Pressure Injection System 
(HPIS) from Wash-1400. appendix 2, (15). 
Network reliability has been extensively treated in the literature. 
Although of a general nature, much of the work has been aimed at com-
munication networks. Surveys of work in this field are given in (16) and (17). 
Methods for finding all paths between two nodes in a network have been 
presented by Fu and Yau (18), and Kroft (1 9). The terminal unavailability, 
i. e. the probability that the two nodes do not communicate at a given time 
point, can then be calculated as the probability that all paths between the 
two nodes are disconnected. 
Jensen and Bellmore (20) developed an algorithm for determining all 
minimal cut sets for the communication between two nodes. The bounding 
technique of Esary and Proschan (21) was used to provide a lower limit to 
the terminal availability. 
Nelson, Batts and Beadles (22) developed a method for the enumeration 
of all minimal cut sets between two nodes provided that the path sets were 
given. From either path or cut sets the terminal availability can be calcu-
lated by using the inclusion-exclusion technique (23). 
Other methods for the calculation of various network reliability param-
eters are given in references 24-28. 
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The network program in the FAUNET package is described in section 4. 
For a network where links (components) and/or nodes can fail, the program 
TIENET calculates all paths between two specified nodes. The paths rep-
resent the success tree of the network. The Dual of this, the fault tree, is 
written on an output file. By subjecting the fault tree to a calculation with 
the CUT programs, all the minimal cut sets of the network can be found. 
If failure and repair distributions of links and nodes are known, the terminal 
unavailability can be found by using the UNA programs. 
The network program can handle networks with both uni- and bi-direc-
tional links. 
In section 4 the program is applied to two examples taken from refer-
ences 20 and 22. 
1. INPUT DATA AND TREE PROGRAMS 
The format of the input data for the fault trees is illustrated by the 
data for the fault tree for the Dresden-3 system. The data are shown in 
fig. 1. They were obtained from appendix E in(1 3)where the tree structure 
was given in terms of logical FORTRAN statements. The first line in the 
file contains the name of the fault tree (FORTRAN format A6). Each of the 
following lines defines a gate in the tree in the form: gate type - gate num-
ber - number of gate inputs - list of gate inputs. The FORTRAN format is 
Al, 2014. The gate type is specified .is + or O for an OR gate, and as X or 
A for an AND gate. Events are indexed from 1 to 999 and gates are in-
dexed from 1000 to 2000. The order in which the gates are defined in the 
file is immaterial. The $ sign in the last line denotes the end of the file. 
For convenience in writing input files, the data can be written in free 
format with commas as delimiters. A program, FREE, then reads the 
input data in free format and produces an output file of data for either the 
Primal or the Dual tree in fixed format. The Dual tree is obtained from 
the Primal by converting AND gates to OR gates and vice versa, and by 
letting the basic events denote their logical inverses. 
The TREE package consists of 4 programs: 
TREECH, the error checking program, reads the input data in fixed 
format and lists the number of OR and AND gates and the number of basic 
events. It also produces a list of basic events and gates together with the 
the number of times they occur in the tree. It checks the tree to see if it 
is connected and to see if there are multiple definitions of a gate. If further-
more checks the tree for loops. Finally, it calculates the number of B1CS 
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(Boolean Indicated Cut Sets (2)) and the maximum length of these for each 
gate. Apart from checking the data for errors, the functions performed by 
TREECH are helpful in assessing the size of the problem in the following 
calculation of minimal cut sets. As an option, the functions of TREECH 
can be performed on the Dual tree instead of the Primal. The information 
obtained is then pertinent to the path sets (tie sets) of the fault tree. 
Figures 2 and 3, respectively, show the output produced by TREECH 
for the Primal and the Dual versions of the fault tree Dresden-3. The 
asterisks in the last line of fig. 2 just indicate that the number of BICS 
exceeded the format of the output statement. The number will be about 
33 • 101 2 . 
TREEIN, the input module for the graphical programs, accepts input 
data in fixed format. The program asks for a specification of a top event 
(Gate). As a default it takes the gate in the second line of the input data 
(gate 1060 in fig. 1). With the selected top event as an ancestor, the program 
orders gates and events according to the generation in which they occur, 
and it allocates each component (gates and events) an initial set of coordi-
nates for its position in the graph. 
The structural description i s stored in COMMON. Overflow data are 
left on a file for processing in a later pass. 
TREEBA, the balancing module, accepts the tree description in 
COMMON from TREEIN and calculates new x-coordinates for positioning 
gates and events to give, as far as possible, a well balanced picture. 
Initially, all components are placed as far to the left as possible. The 
tree is squeezed along the left edge of the picture. The balancing is an 
iterative process, moving the components from their initial left positions 
to the right on the plane. In a series of upwards and downwards scans the 
algorithm tries to establish a position of any gate name (output) and the 
inputs to the gate so that the output is placed above the central input, in the 
case of an odd number of inputs, or in the middle of the two central inputs 
in the case ol an even number of inputs. The inputs are moved in the down-
going scan, and the outputs in the upgoing. The components do not move 
more than allowed by their neighbours. Only movements toward the right 
are permitted. 
This process is repeated until no further movements occur. The result 
is still kept in COMMON while the output module is called. 
TREEOU, the output module, draws the structure on the lineprinter, 
specifying gates by type, number and connection to inputs. 
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If there are more data than allowed on one sheet, the control i s given 
back to TREEIN for another pass to evaluate the next part of the tree from 
the data stored in the overflow file. 
If a gate occurs more than once in the input data, the subtree corre-
sponding to this gate i s developed the first time it appears as input (i. e. as 
near to the top gate as possible). The next time it occurs, e. g. in another 
branch or in a later generation, it is not expanded into its subtree but only 
referred to by the gate number. It i s . nevertheless, possible to force the 
subtree corresponding to the gate to be "pressed" downwards in the tree by 
adding an extra line in the input data above the actual gate definition. This 
line should contain the gate number with no inputs. As gate type an * may 
be used to indicate that it i s a subtree. 
If a gate i s "pressed" out of the tree in this way it will be processed 
separately and drawn on a separate sheet (e. g. gate 1055 in fig. 4). 
2. CUT PROGRAMS 
The package consists of 7 programs: 
CUTSET Input and gate contraction 
CUTUP Factoring, or modularisation, (bottom-up analysis) 
CUTGO Evaluation of minimal cut sets 
CUTOFL Overflow handling 
CUTRED Inter-block reduction 
CUTOUT Result calculation 
CUTEV Expansion of factorized minimal sets (optional) 
Each of the first 6 programs calls the next in sequence by CHAIN. 
CUTSET reads the input data in fixed format and asks for the highest 
order of sets wanted in the result together with a specification of the top 
event. As a default it uses the gate defined in the second line of the input 
file. The user may specify whether he requires a cut set or a tie set (path 
set) calculation of the fault tree. The program then contracts subsequent 
gates of the same type in the tree into a single gate, so that the tree struc-
ture becomes an alternating sequence of OR and AMD gates. The data that 
are stored in COMMON are now ready for the next step: 
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CUTUP performs a bottom-up analysis by identifying primitive factors, 
i. e. a pair of basic events always occurring together in the same types of 
gate. Such a pair is replaced by a dummy event, here called a "complex 
event", while a description of this factor in terms of its type and inputs is 
written at the top of the result file. If, in the next pass, two complex events 
(or a complex event and a basic event) always appear as a pair in the same 
types of gate, they are combined into a new complex event and so on. This 
process continues until no more pairs are found. For each pass CUTUP 
prints "FACTORIZE ". Finally CUTUP calls: 
CUTGO, which identifies itself by the message "EVALUATE". CUTGO 
performs the actual evaluation of the cut sets/path sets. The evaluation is 
based on the Fussell Veseley algorithm (12). A description of the algorithm 
together with an application to a simple fault tree is also contained in (23). 
All operations in CUTGO are performed in a single one-dimensional 
array placed in COMMON. The first part of the array contains the descrip-
tion of the factorized fault tree. Each gate is specified by type and inputs 
(gates, basic and/or complex events). For each gate there is a pointer to 
the array element where the information about the next gate begins. The 
remaining part of the array is reserved for cut set expansions. From now 
on this part is called the buffer. 
The evaluation starts by replacing the top event with a list of its inputs. 
The list is placed in the buffer preceded by a pointer to indicate its length. 
The program then looks up the first gate in the buffer and expands it ac-
cording to the Fussell Veseley algorithm. An AND gate will be expanded 
into a single and, in most cases, longer list of inputs. An OR gate will 
usually give rise to several new lists of the same length as the old one. 
The resulting lists are added to the lists already in the buffer together with 
pointers and the array elements which have been occupied by the old list 
are set free. 
Every time the buffer is filled, i. e. no more free space is available at 
the end of the buffer, CUTGO performs a garbage collection to retrieve the 
free elements. 
When no more free space is available, CUTGO enters the minimization 
phase. Here all cut sets, whether fully evaluated or not, are sorted ac-
cording to size and compared for removal of all redundant sets. The 
message "MINIMIZE" is printed. 
If some cut sets are removed, the program goes back to garbage col-
lection followed by further expansions. If not, the overflow handler is 
called. 
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If the evaluation is finished (no cut sets contain gates as inputs) the 
overflow handler is called too. 
CUTOFL. the overflow handler, starts with the message "OVERFLOW". 
This module extracts all partially evaluated sets as well as sets of order 
higher than that specified by the user as maximum. The sets are extracted 
from the array in COMMON and added to an overflow file on backing store. 
The remaining sets art then added tc the result file. 
Finally, if there are any overflow data of lower order than the maximal, 
they are loaded into the buffer and control i s given back to CUTGO to perform 
further evaluations. 
If there are no more overflow data, or all the overflow data are of 
higher order than that specified as maximum, and all cut sets in the buffer 
have been fully evaluated, the control is given to: 
CUTRED, which performs an inter-block minimization between the 
blocks in the result file that have been produced by several passes between 
CUTGO and CUTOFL. The message "REDUCE" is printed. CUTRED 
finally sorts all minimal sets in the result file according to order and 
input events. 
The result file is a file containing: 
1) calculation type (CUTSET/TIESET) and fault tree name, 
2) a list of factors (definitions of complex events), 
3) all minimal cut sets / t ie sets found with order less than or equal to 
the maximal required. 
CUTOUT is the final program that scans the result file and calculates 
the number of minimal sets of any order for the factorized tree, as well as 
the number of minimal sets for the original tree. 
CUTEV, an independent program, may be called optionally. It accepts 
the result file as input, and as output it produces a list of the minimal sets 
for the original tree. 
Examples 
Example 1, Dresden-3 
Figure 5 shows the questions and the messages printed by the computer 
and the answers typed by the operator under the execution of the Dresden-3 
fault tree. The first line is a run command to the operating system. In the 
next lines the operator specifies that he requires a cut set calculation on the 
input data existing as a disk (DSK) file DRESD3. He makes certain that the 
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cut sets are calculated to any order by typing 999 as answer to the question 
about the highest order wanted. As a default, the computer selects gate 
1060 as top event. 
After having made several passes through minimization, overflow and 
evaluate stages, the output module CUTOUT prints the number and the order 
of the minimal cut sets for the factorized tree and for the original tree. For 
the Dresden-3 fault tree the modularization technique causes a reduction of 
the total number of minimal cut sets from 11 934 to 48. 
The result file is listed in fig. 6. The first line contains the name of 
the fault tree together with a specification of the type (cut/tie) of the sets. 
The following lines contain the definitions of the complex events, which are 
indexed from 999 and downwards; -1 indicates an OR gate, -2 an AND gate. 
The second line in the file thus shows that complex event no. 999 is an OR 
gate with the basic events 50 and 51 as inputs. 
The 48 minimal cut sets follow after a mark (-959 here). The first 
number in each line is just an indication of the number of data in the line. 
If the complex events in these cut sets were expanded (e. g. by CUTEV) 
according to their definitions, the 11 934 minimal sets for the original tree 
would be obtained. 
Figures 7-8 show the calculation of the minimal tie sets for the Dresden-3 
fault tree. The complex events in fig. 8 are, of course, identical to those in 
fig. 6, except for the fact that OR gates in the Primal tree are converted to 
AND gates in the Dual tree. The total number of path sets are 8 both for the 
factorized tree and for the original tree, but they are of considerably lower 
order in the factorized tree. 
Example 2, HPIS 
Figures 9-13 show the input data, the outputs of the checking program, 
and the minimal cut set programs for the fault tree of the High Pressure 
Injection System taken from appendix 2 of Wash-1400. The 81 79 minimal 
cut sets of the original tree are reduced to 52 minimal sets in the factorized 
tree. 
It was not possible to calculate all the minimal path sets of the HPIS 
fault tree. As seen from fig, 11, there are 248832 BICS (or rather BIPS, 
Boolean Indicated Path Sets) of maximal length 1 74. The number, and size, 
of the actual minimal path sets, even for the factorized tree, exceeded the 
capacity of the PDP8 minicomputer. 
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3. PROBABILITY PROGRAMS. UNA 
The UNA programs calculate system unavailability from the minimal 
sets of the factorized tree when failure, repair and test data are given for 
the components of the system. The components are assumed to be statisti-
cally independent. 
In their present form the programs accept exponentially distributed 
failure times and repair times that are either constant or exponentially 
distributed. They also accept constant failure probabilities for components 
with a fixed probability of failure per demand. For the purpose of treating 
components where failures are only detected at tests, the programs further-
more allow the specification of constant test intervals. 
In order to minimize the requirements to core storage space, the 
programs perform a dynamic allocation of storage space similar to that 
used in the CUT programs. Only a single one-dimensional array is used. 
In the following the array that is placed in COMMON is called the internal 
buffer. 
UNAVA1, the main program, administrates the subroutine calls. It 
first calls: 
UNAIN1, which reads the basic failure, repair and test data from the 
input data file. The information is stored in the internal buffer. The 
program then reads the complex events (i. e. type, number and inputs) from 
the cut/tie set file, the result file from the CUT programs. This infor-
mation is also placed in the internal buffer. Finally, the program reads 
the minimal sets from the same file and stores them in a direct access 
disk file, the external buffer. The control is then given back to the main 
program which asks the operator to specify the time points at which he 
requires the calculations performed and the number of inclusion-exclusion 
terms , he needs in the calculation of the system unavailability. The 
main program then calls: 
UNASU1, which calculates the unavailability of the components from 
their failure data. If a component has an exponential failure distribution 
with failure rate X and exponential repair distribution with mean repair 
time r, the unavailability as a function of time t i s given by the well known 
expression 
u<t» . T ^ - n - . - P * ' / ^ , 
when the component was operating at time 0. 
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If the component has an exponential failure distribution with failure 
rate X and constant repair time r the unavailability i s given by £9) 
[t/r] 
j=o 
where [ t / r ] denotes the greatest integer contained in t /r . 
For a component with an exponential failure distribution 1 - e~ and 
constant repair time r, and subjected to periodic tests with a test interval 
T, so that failures are revealed and repaired at tests only, the point un-
availability i s easily found to be given by the expression: 
u(t) 
1 - e - U 
(1-o) ( l -e ' U '* + o 
(1 -o)(1 - e " U , ) 
• . ( l - e - M f - r ) , 
for 
for 
for 
t < T 
t * T 
t ? T 
and V = r 
and V ) r 
-XT * 
here t' = t modulo T, and a - 1 -e . It is assumed that r * T. 
After having calculated the unavailabilities of all the components the 
program stores the results in the internal buffer and the next subroutine 
is called. 
UNACP1 calculates the probabilities of the complex events from the 
probabilities of the basic events, i. e. the unavailabilities of the components. 
If the complex event 1 is an OR gate with input events (basic or complex) 
m and n, the probability p, oi the complex event is given by 
Pi * P™ + Pn - P™ * P« » r l r m r n *m r n ' 
where p and p are the probabilities of the statistically independent input 
events. For an AND gate the corresponding expression is given by 
Pi * Pm ' Pn ' 
Having calculated the probabilities of all complex events, the program 
stores the results in the internal buffer and the main program calls: 
UNAFI1, which performs the final calculation of system unavailability 
from the minimal sets of the factorized tree and from the probabilities of 
basic and complex events. 
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The program calculates the probability of the union of the minimal sets 
by using the inclusion-exclusion technique(23). In its presentform the 
program is able to include the three first terms in the expansion. 
Example, Dresden-3 
The failure data for the Dresden-3 fault tree are taken from table 2.10 
of the Holms and Narver report (13). Figure 14 shows the data written as a 
free format input file for the UNA programs. Each line in the file consists 
of component number, calculation type, number of succeeding data inputs, 
failure data, mean repair time and test interval. 
Generally, calculation type 1 denotes a constant failure probability; 
type 2, exponential failure and repair distributions; while types 3 and 4 
denote exponential failure distribution and constant repair time. In the case 
of type 4, failures are only detected at tests. 
Failure data are either constant probabilities (calculation type s 1), or 
failure rates. In both cases the program multiplies the number in the input 
file by 10"6 . 
In the HN report, the Dresden-3 fault tree was run with the SAFTE 
Monte Carlo simulation code. The failure rates given for the components 
were used, but the components were assumed to be non-repairable. Vesely(14) 
also used this fault tree to illustrate the KITT computer codes. Because of 
the amount of cut sets in the fault tree, Vesely based bis calculations on the 
minimal path sets. A KITT-1 run was made with the 8 minimal path sets 
found. The failure rates used were those given in the HN report. Vesely 
also made a KITT-2 run in order to obtain results for the repairable system. 
The components were assumed to have constant repair times, the average 
repair times given in the HN report were used and the standard deviations 
associated with the actual normal repair distributions were ignored. Vesely 
obtained the exact answer by using all inclusion-exclusion terms for the 
minimal path sets . In general, it i s necessary to use all terms in a prob-
ability calculation based on minimal path sets in order to obtain sufficient 
accuracy when the component failure probabilities are small. 
Figures 15-16 show the results of calculations with the UNA programs 
for the same cases as considered by Vesely. In contrast to his calculations, 
the calculations here were based on minimal cut sets , i. e. the 48 minimal 
cut sets of the reduced fault tree. Two inclusion-exclusion terms were 
calculated. The terms provide upper and lower bounds to the exact prob-
abilities. As seen from the figures, the first term alone gives a sufficiently 
accurate answer for most of the time range considered. 
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To facilitate comparison with the results from (1 3) and (14), figure 1 5 
shows a calculation for the non-repairable case with time points corre-
sponding to an integer number of weeks. The results are in good agreement 
with the graphs in (1 3) and (14). 
For the repairable case, the results are given in figure 16 for the time 
points corresponding to those calculated in (14). The results in figure 1 6 
differ slightly in the second decimal point from those in (14). The error is 
presumably due to the small word length in the PDP8 minicomputer 
(mantissa = 24 bits). 
4. NETWORK PROGRAM: TIENET 
For a network with bi- or uni-directional links (components) the program 
calculates all paths between two nodes specified by the user. The paths 
represent the "success" tree of the network. The Dual of this, the fault 
tree, i s written on an output file. The data are acceptable in this form as 
input data for the CUT programs. 
The algorithm used here is identical in principle to that given by 
Kroft(1 9),but the implementation differs. Kroft's algorithm was based on 
a description of the nodes only. We are interested in obtaining the fault 
tree of the system in terms of its representation by minimal cut sets where 
the basic events represent failures of components or nodes, or both. It is 
therefore necessary to use a description of the network in terms of its 
links as well as of its nodes. 
Example 2 in reference 22 is used to illustrate the performance of 
TIENET. The network is shown in figure 1 7. As seen from the figure, all 
links are uni-directional. The component numbers are those given in 22. 
The nodes have been given the numbers shown in the figure. 
The input data file i s shown in figure 18. Each line in the file consists 
of: component number - input node - output node. The component numbers 
in this file are all negative, which signifies that the links are uni-directional. 
Bi-directional links are written with positive component numbers in the 
input data. TIENET then replaces each bi-directional link with its two 
uni-directional equivalents. 
Two internal l ists, a component list and a node list, figure 19, are 
made by TIENET from the input data. Both lists are placed in the same 
one-dimensional array. The component list is a list of component descrip-
tions arranged according to component number. Each component descrip-
tion contains: component number - input node - output node. In the node 
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list each node is described in terms of the next components that can be 
reached from it by a flow originating in the node. Each node description 
consists of: a pointer L to the first element in the next node description -
node number - N, the total number of succeeding component pointers - an 
element with a pointer (IPREV) to the previous node encountered in the 
instant path search - a pointer (IFLAG) pointing towards one of the succeeding 
component pointers, the one representing the component under investigation 
in the instant path search (IFLAG/ 0 indicates that the node has been en-
countered previously in the path search) - and a series of N component 
pointers (each pointer pointing towards the corresponding component 
description in the component list). 
A flowchart of the search algorithm used in TIENET i s given in figure 
20. The algorithm searches out all paths between the start node and the 
end node, avoiding paths with loops. 
The output file from TIENET is shown in figure 2 ! . If the output-file 
i s subjected to a "cut set" calculation by the CUT programs the minimal 
cut sets of the network are found and written out in standard form, figure 22. 
If the file is subjected to a "tie set" calculation, the minimal path sets of 
the network are written out, figure 23. The expanded minimal cut and path 
sets are identical to those found in (22). 
As a second example we use the network given in figure 1 of reference 
20. It is reproduced here in figure 24. The input data file i s shown in 
figure 25. 
Figure 26 shows three runs of TIENET for the paths between nodes 1 
and 8; one for nodes only, one for components only, and one for both nodes 
and components. When the three output files are used as inputs to the CUT 
programs, the results in figures 27 - 29 are obtained. The minimal cut 
sets for components only are identical to those found in (20). The number 
of minimal cut sets differs in the three cases because of the difference in 
vulnerability of the network to node failures and to link failures. 
The number of minimal path sets i s , of course, the same in the three 
cases . The only difference l ies in the way in which they are specified. 
The path sets for components only are shown in figure 30. 
- 18 -
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DRESD3 
xieee 
xies9 
• 1853 
• 1051 
+ 1859 
+ 1849 
+ 1048 
+ 1847 
+ 1846 
• 1852 
• 1845 
• 1844 
• 1843 
+1842 
+ 1841 
+1840 
+ 1839 
+1838 
X1858 
X105? 
• 1837 
+ 1836 
+ 1834 
• 1833 
• 1832 
X1856 
• 1828 
• 1827 
• 181? 
+1830 
+ 1829 
+1831 
X1855 
+1826 
+ 1825 
• 1835 
+ 1824 
+ 1823 
• 1822 
• 1821 
• 1828 
• 1819 
• 1818 
X1054 
• 1011 
• 1810 
+ 1889 
• 1008 
• 1887 
• 1886 
• 1016 
+ 1815 
+ 1814 
• 1013 
• 1012 
• 1005 
• 1004 
• 1003 
+ 1002 
+ 1001 
210591858 
21845185? 
218511852 
21850 55 
218481849 
2 53 54 
2 521847 
218461057 
2 51 50 
2 56 57 
218431044 
2 48 49 
2 471842 
210401841 
2 45 46 
2 441039 
210381855 
2 42 43 
210551857 
3103218341037 
210251836 
2 4ø 41 
218201833 
2 36 37 
210311056 
210281038 
210171027 
2 30 31 
2 181015 
210091829 
2 32 33 
2 34 35 
3181918221826 
210231825 
3 2910351824 
2 38 39 
2 27 28 
2 25 26 
218201821 
2 21 22 
2 23 24 
210181054 
2 19 28 
210111016 
2 121010 
2 111009 
2 løløøe 
210061807 
2 8 9 
2 2 7 
2 171015 
2 161014 
210121013 
2 14 15 
2 121005 
210031004 
2 5 6 
210011002 
2 2 4 
2 1 2 
f 
Fif. 1. lapot data for tl» DrMdw-3 feult trøt. 
CHECK OF INPUT DATA FOR DRESD3 (PR I USD 
SATE I960 OCCURS ON LEF1 SIDE RUT NOT ON RIGHT 
MO OF DIFFERENT OR - GATES • 53 
NO OF DIFFERENT AND - GATES * 7 
TOTAL NO OF DIFFERENT 
MO OF DIFFERENT EVENT 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
1 
4 
13 
4 
25 
2 
37 
2 
49 
1 
2 
8 
14 
4 
26 
2 
38 
4 
59 
1 
GATES * 
S • 
J 
4 
15 
4 
27 
4 
39 
4 
51 
1 
4 
4 
1« 
4 
28 
4 
40 
2 
52 
1 
5 
4 
17 
2 
29 
4 
41 
2 
53 
1 
Cd 
57 
6 
4 
18 
2 
3«i 
2 
42 
1 
54 
1 
7 
4 
19 
2 
31 
2 
43 
1 
55 
1 
8 
4 
2«. 
2 
32 
2 
44 
1 
56 
1 
9 
4 
21 
2 
J3 
2 
45 
1 
57 
1 
10 
4 
22 
2 
34 
2 
46 
1 
11 
2 
23 
4 
35 
2 
47 
1 
12 
2 
24 
4 
3* 
2 
4$ 
1 
GATE PICS MAX LENGTH REPLICATION 
1901 
1082 
1093 
1094 
100S 
1906 
1997 
1998 
1999 
1919 
1911 
1912 
1913 
1914 
1915 
191« 
1917 
1919 
1919 
1929 
1921 
1922 
1923 
2 
2 
4 
2 
6 
2 
4 
5 
6 
7 
7 
2 
9 
19 
11 
11 
2 
79 
2 
2 
4 
2 
Wig, 2. TREECH output for 
DATE •ICS NAX LENGTH REPLICATION 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1027 
1928 
1929 
1939 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1036 
1037 
1938 
1939 
1049 
1941 
1942 
1043 
1044 
1049 
1046 
1047 
1048 
1049 
1850 
1051 
1052 
1053 
1054 
1055 
1056 
1057 
1058 
1059 
2 
3 
7 
2 
13 
2 
7 
2 
93 
2 
4 
2 
2 
7 
2 
2214 
2215 
2 
2217 
2218 
2 
2229 
2 
2606 
2607 
2 
2609 
2619 
2 
2612 
77 
2212 
91 
2694 
5769949 
5798642 
i960********** 
8 
8 
16 
to 
to 
3 fault trøø. 
CHECK OF INR0T DATA FOR DRESDJ ( DUI^ L > 
GATE 18C0 OCCURS ON LEFT SIDE PUT NOT ON RIGHT 
NO OF DIFFERENT OR - GATES » 7 
NO OF DIFFERENT AND - GATES * 53 
TOTAL NO OF DIFFERENT GATES > 
NO OF DIFFERENT EVENTS « 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
RE.niCATION 
1 
4 
13 
4 
25 
2 
37 
2 
49 
1 
2 
14 
4 
2« 
2 
38 
4 
98 
1 
3 
4 
15 
4 
27 
4 
39 
4 
51 
1 
4 
4 
1« 
4 
28 
4 
48 
2 
52 
1 
4 
17 
2 
2» 
4 
41 
2 
53 
1 
57 
4 
IS 
2 
J* 
2 
42 
1 
54 
1 
7 
4 
19 
2 
31 
4. 
43 
1 
55 
1 
4 
2« 
2 
32 
2 
44 
1 
5« 
1 
9 
4 
21 
2 
33 
2 
45 
1 
57 
1 
id 
4 
22 
2 
34 
2 
4« 
1 
11 
2 
23 
4 
35 
2 
47 
1 
12 
2 
24 
4 
3« 
2 
48 
1 
OATE •1CS NAX LENGTH REPLICATION 
1 »81 
1882 
1883 
1884 
I M S 
188« i 
1887 J 
I N I 
1889 
1818 
1811 i 
1*12 i 
1813 ] 
1814 1 
IMS i 
181« 1 
1817 1 
1818 i 
1819 J 
1828 J 
1821 1 
1822 i 
1823 i 
I 2 1 
I 2 1 
t 4 1 
l 2 1 
t * 1 
i % t 
l 4 1 
l 5 2 
l C 1 
l 7 1 
l 7 1 
l 2 1 
l » 1 
L 18 2 
l 11 1 
l 11 1 
t 2 1 
l 13 1 
L 2 2 
L 2 1 
l 4 1 
l 2 1 
GATE 8ICS MAX LENGTH REPL 
1824 
1825 
182« 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1838 
1831 
1832 
1833 
1834 
1833 
1S3C 
1837 
1838 
1839 
1848 
1841 
1842 
1843 
1844 1 
1845 
1S4C i 
1847 
1849 
1849 i 
1898 « 
1831 < 
1832 1 
1833 < 
1834 i 
1*33 < 
1858 i 
1837 i 
1898 1 
1839 1 
18C8 11 
1 2 1 
1 S 2 
1 7 1 
1 2 1 
1 13 1 
1 2 1 
1 7 1 
1 2 1 
2 19 1 
1 2 1 
l 4 1 
l 2 1 
1 2 1 
1 7 1 
1 2 1 
* 19 1 
• 1« 1 
t 2 1 
» 19 1 
» 19 1 
L Z 1 
1 21 1 
2 1 
S 17 1 
• 19 1 
L 2 1 
• 28 1 
> 21 1 
L 2 1 
l 23 1 
t 11 1 
> 13 2 
S 13 1 
1 19 2 
» 19 1 
> 23 1 
i 23 
CO 
to 
i t « . S. T R U C K output for O M OWU øf tht DrøøéøN-l feult trø«. 
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1 SVSTEH: DRESD3 PART: 
I960 
X 
1059 1058 
X X 
/ >N N /-/\-\ 
1045 1053 1055 1057 
• • 
/ /\ \ /—/\ \ 
1042 1044 1051 1052 
• • •• • 
/ — / \ — S /-/\-\ /-/\-\ /-/\-\ 
47 1042 48 49 1050 5? 5« 57 
• • 
/ /\ \ / /\ S 
1040 1041 1048 104? 
• • • + 
/ - / S — \ /-/\-S /-/\-\ /~/\-\ 
44 1039 45 46 52 1047 53 54 
• • 
/-/\-\ /-/N-N 
1038 1055 1046 1057 
• + 
/-/S-S /-/S-\ 
42 43 51 50 
Flf. *• Drøødm-3 fault tr«*. 
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1 SVSTEN: DRES03 PART: 
1857 
X 
1032 1034 
\ 
1031 
• 
/-/\-\ 
34 35 
1056 
X 
/ /S-
1028 
• 
/—/\ s 
1020 
• 
\ /-/\-N /-/\-\ 
1030 23 24 36 37 
1837 
/-/S-\ 
1633 1025 1036 
• " • 
/-/\-S 
40 41 
/ r 
1017 
• 
/—/\—\ 
18 1015 
/ /\-
16 
/ 
1012 
• 
/ /\ 
13 
\ S 
1027 
• 
/-/\-\ 
30 31 
S 
1014 
/-
10 
— / \ S 
1013 
•—\ /-
1005 14 
/S-N 
15 
/ / 
1009 
/\ \ 
'S S 
1029 
+ 
/-/\-\ 
1008 32 33 
/—/\-
1006 
+ 
/-/\-S 
2 7 
\ 
1007 
/-/\-\ 
9 9 
/ /s \ 
1003 
/—-/S S 
løøl 
• 
1 2 
1002 5 
• 
/-/S-S 
3 4 
1004 
•» 
/-/S-\ 
6 
1 
PI*. 4. Or«*d«n-3 fault tr««. 
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1 SYSTEM: DRES03 PART: 
/--
1018 
/-/\-\ 
19 20 
1019 
+ 
--/\ \ 
10S4 
X 
/ /\— 
1011 
/-/\-\ / 
12 lølø 17 
11 1009 
1053 
X 
/~/\— -\ 
1020 1021 
• 
—\ /-
1*1« 21 
+ 
-/\-\ 
1015 
/\-S 
22 
/ 
25 
/ — 
1023 
-/\-\ 
2« 
1026 
4 
~/s s 
1025 
/ /: \— 
29 1035 
4 
/-/\-\ 
38 39 
\ 
1024 
• 
/-/\-\ 
27 28 
1 
Fif. 4. Orøødøa-3 fault \x—. 
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R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF: 
FILE DSK»: DRESt-3 
SYSTEM DRESl>i 
HIGHEST ORDER MANTEO * 999 
TOP GATE 
GATE 186« SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORIZE 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOU 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMISE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOW 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOU 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOU 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOW 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF DftESDj 
REDUCED CUTSET 
1 SETS OF ORDER 
SET 4 
13. 
19 
le 
1. 
OF ORDER 
SETS OF ORDER 
SETS OF ORDER 
SETS OF ORDER 
SETS OF ORDER 
48 
EVALUATED 
10 
428. 
2816. 
5464. 
2824 
192 
CUTSET: 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
11934. 
Fif. & Teletype output during calculation of minimal cut eela of the 
Draadan-3 fault tree. 
CUTSET OF E-RESD3 
4 -1 
4 -a 
4 -a 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
4 -1 
« -1 
4 -.1 
4 -1 
Q 7 
3 2 4 2 
4 2 
4 962 
4 »79 
9 2 
9 17 
9 17 
9 17 
9 969 
S 969 
999 
99S> 
997 
996 
999 
»94 
993 
992 
' t 
i"» 
989 
988 
987 
98« 
»89 
»84 
»85 
»82 
»91 
»89 
»79 
978 
977 
»7* 
979 
974 
»73 
»72 
»71 
»79 
969 
969 
9« 7 
»66 
965 
9*4 
963 
9(2 
961 
969 
979 
979 
»75 
979 
»94 
»79 
9*9 
»79 
»79 
»79 
979 
59 
42 
34 
27 
23 
19 
7 
1 
92 
44 
29 
3* 
21 
9 
4 
54 
46 
39 
32 
11 
6 
56 
48 
49 
29 
986 
14 
978 
977 
»82 
16 
972 
971 
969 
968 
»67 
966 
963 
18 
31 
999 
987 
»76 
974 
995 
976 
»79 
»74 
»89 
»74 
»81 
51 
43 
35 
i S 
24 
29 
8 
J. 
*»*' 
45 • 
IS 
37 
22 
19 
•i 
55 
47 
989 
33 
12 
13 
57 
49 
41 
26 
993 
15 
984 
»83 
»»6 
»73 
991 
999 
979 
999 
998 
989 
992 
39 
961 
998 
»95 
»95 
997 
987 988 
974 995 
995 997 
»»5 997 
»94 995 
994 »95 
9 
5 
5 
5 
9 
9 
5 
6 
6 
6 
C 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
< 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
8 
»62 
962 
9(2 
»62 
»62 
979 
975 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
»69 
»69 
»69 
969 
962 
»62 
962 
»62 
962 
962 
962 
»75 
17 
17 
17 
17 
17 
»69 
969 
»62 
»62 
962 
17 
»79 
»79 
»79 
»79 
»74 
»97 
976 
»69 
»69 
»69 
»7* 
»79 
»74 
»75 
»79 
»7* 
»74 
»75 
979 
»79 
»79 
»74 
»75 
»75 
»75 
»76 
»69 
»69 
»69 
»74 
»75 
»74 
975 
»75 
»75 
975 
»69 
»74 
»99 
999 
»91 
»75 
»99 
»94 
»79 
»79 
»74 
»74 
»99 
»75 
»76 
»74 
»81 
»75 
»76 
»89 
989 
991 
975 
976 
»76 
»76 
297 
»79 
»74 
»75 
»75 
»76 
975 
»76 
976 
»7« 
»76 
»75 
»97 
»91 
»95 
»»4 
»76 
»»4 
»95 
»74 
»99 
»75 
»97 
997 
»76 
»99 
»97 
»87 
»76 
»81 
»81 
9*7 
987 
976 
989 
»99 
»91 
»99 
»99 
»75 
»76 
»76 
»99 
»76 
»91 
»99 
»99 
»91 
»76 
»89 
»»5 
»»7 
»95 
»*5 
»»7 
»»7 
»97 
»91 
»76 
»99 
999 
»»5 
»95 
998 
988 
994 
994 
987 
989 
988 
987 
981 
995 
994 
994 
991 
976 
989 
987 
»97 
987 
»87 
981 
987 
»87 
98b 
»9$ 
»95 
»»5 
»»7 
»»7 
» 7 
997 
994 
994 
9*5 
995 
988 
997 
994 
988 
995 
997 
995 
997 
987 
987 
981 
988 
98* 
989 
988 
987 
»8« 
9SS 
981 
988 
»88 
995 
9*7 
997 
»94 
994 
989 
*»7 
9»4 
987 988 
Result HI« for th9 Dresden-) fault tr99. 
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R CUTSET 
CUTSET OP TIESET TIESET 
TIESET OF DSK 
FILE C'SKt DRESP3 
SVSTEH: DRESD3 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED = 999 
TOP GATE 
GATE 1060 SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORIZE 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOW 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF DRESD2 
REDUCED TIESET 
4 SETS OF ORDER 2 
4 SETS OF ORDER 4 
8 
EVALUATED TIESET 
SETS 
SETS 
SETS 
SETS 
SETS 
OF 
OF 
OF 
Of 
OF 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
4 
7 
9 
11 
15 
8 
TIESET OF DRESCj 
~z 
""it 
~z 
-2 
~2 
"* 
-2 
-2 
-2 
~2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
*2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
* i 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
-2 
** 
-2 
970 
970 
987 
988 
2 
2 
«' 
999 
998 
997 
99« 
995 
994 
99« 
992 
991 
990 
989 
986 
987 
98« 
985 
984 
983 
982 
981 
989 
979 
978 
977 
976 
975 
974 
973 
972 
971 
97« 
969 
968 
967 
966 
965 
964 
963 
962 
961 
960 
975 
976 
995 
995 
17 
96« 
974 
»?4 
50 
42 
34 
27 
21 
19 
7 
1 
52 
44 
29 
16 
21 
9 
4 
54 
46 
39 
32 
11 
6 
56 
48 
40 
25 
986 
14 
978 
977 
982 
16 
972 
971 
969 
968 
967 
966 
963 
18 
31 
962 
962 
98« 
991 
51 
43 
35 
28 
24 
20 
8 
T A 
53 
45 
38 
37 
22 
10 
5 
55 
47 
989 
33 
12 
13 
57 
49 
41 
26 
993 
15 
984 
983 
996 
973 
99i 
990 
979 
999 
999 
985 
992 
30 
961 
994 
997 
994 
4*7 
Fig. 7. Tolotjrpo oatpat owing catcalaMon of 
minimal path oota of tao Prwdaa - t fea't trot. 
f i g . i . Minimal path ooto of the Draadon-3 
fault troo. 
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HP IS 
•løee 
+1012 
•1604 
+ 1926 
• 1 6 1 •> 
••:v::l 
• 1062 
•iee: 
X1661 
+ 1014 
+ 106? 
• 1005 
•1002 
+ 101*. 
-1016 
X1010 
*iøøe 
+ 1?07 
+ 1617 
+ 1018 
Xløll 
+ 1008 
+ 1662 
+ lii44 
+ 1045 
M040 
M041 
+ie : r 
+ 1041 
+ i e42 
:aø22 
• 1029 
+ 1A26 
+ 1049 
+ 1056 
::iø47 
+ 1051 
+ 1052 
:iø4S 
+ 104É 
+ 1658 
+ 1057 
XI65 6 
+ 1654 
+ 1666 
• 1059 
+ 1655 
XI65 2 
• 1064 
•1070 
+ 1634 
•1671 
X1022 
+ 1026 
• 1627 
X1622 
• 1028 
• 1029 
X1022 
X1033 
X1024 
X1030 
• 1631 
1025 
• 1621 
•1025 
+1672 
* 
1060 
510011002100310261021 
4 21 22 
4 25 26 
ii9iiie?4 
5 99 101 
4 167 10S 
216201019 
6 130 S3 
9 92 92 
210*21062 
21061 17 
22 
27 
162 
110 
39 
94 
IS 
2161210521014 
316091046 
41625 1 
5 69 70 
5 72 74 
210151016 
61019 5 
3 12 15 
6 77 79 
6 82 84 
210171613 
41011 10 
4 
71 
73 
6 
16 
S0 
85 
11 
216061007100S 
6 61 €2 
6 65 €6 
210441645 
2 5? 60 
210401641 
» 122 134 
4 125 126 
210421942 
12 f? 26 
62 
£7 
135 
190 
21 
2102710231029 
7 39 40 
7 44 45 
216491050 
7 49 50 
7 54 55 
210511652 
216471048 
6 115 116 
21069 114 
210571653 
41956 112 
2 126 127 
21960 124 
51059 129 
219551954 
191979 14 
7 144 146 
101671 142 
10 145 140 
219351964 
21922 123 
51024 19S 
219271026 
21935 193 
41 
46 
51 
56 
117 
113 
167 
125 
121 
109 
147 
127 
153 
196 
3 192 1931033 
219231929 
219341964 
2 1971932 
219241935 
31964 198 
219391931 
199 
24 
2 S 
165 
111 
90 
95" 
•? 
.72 
76 
7 
SI 
36 
t 2 
64 
6* 
191 
186 
22 
42 
47 
52 
57 
113 
192 
122 
102 
143 
142 
154 
192 
41922102319241925 
111972 169 
9 179 171 
161 
172 
162 
173 
106 
91 
96 
1*5 
139 
3 
73 
32 
135 
136 
22 
42 
43 
53 
58 
119 
122 
104 
177 
123 
155 
193 
162 
174 
37 
97 
9 
139 
183 
191 
190 
24 
132 
134 
133 
184 
131 
109 
173 
139 
141 
164 
175 
93 
25 
189 
133 
139 
133 
129 
179 
149 
156 
165 
176 
192 
26 
139 
150 
157 
166 
194 
132 
27 
131 
151 
156 
167 
195 
23 29 
132 
152 
159 
163 169 
Wig. 9. Input data for tb« HPØ fault trta. 
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CHECK OF INPUT CAT* FOR : HPIS (PRIHAL) 
GATE 1888 OCCURS ON LEFT SIDE BUT NOT ON RI6HT 
NO OF DIFFERENT OR - GATES » 49 
NO OF DIFFERENT AND - GATES - 19 
TOTAL NO OF DIFFERENT 6ATES « 68 
NO OF DIFFERENT EVENTS " 199 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
EVENTS 
REPLICATION 
1 
1 
13 
1 
25 
1 
37 
1 
49 
1 
61 
1 
73 
1 
85 
1 
97 
1 
189 
4 
121 
1 
133 
1 
149 
4 
197 
4 
169 
3 
181 
1 
193 
2 
2 
1 
14 
4 
26 
1 
38 
1 
58 
1 
62 
1 
74 
1 
86 
1 
98 
1 
118 
1 
122 
1 
134 
1 
146 
4 
198 
4 
178 
3 
182 
1 
194 
3 
3 
1 
.15 
1 
27 
1 
39 
1 
51 
1 
63 
1 
75 
1 
87 
1 
99 
1 
111 
1 
123 
1 
135 
1 
147 
4 
159 
4 
171 
3 
183 
2 
199 
3 
4 
1 
16 
1 
28 
1 
48 
1 
52 
1 
64 
1 
76 
1 
88 
1 
188 
4 
112 
1 
124 
1 
136 
1 
148 
4 
168 
3 
172 
3 
184 
2 
196 
1 
5 
1 
17 
1 
29 
1 
41 
1 
53 
1 
65 
1 
77 
1 
89 
1 
181 
1 
113 
1 
125 
1 
137 
4 
149 
4 
161 
3 
173 
3 
189 
2 
197 
1 
6 
1 
18 
1 
38 
1 
42 
1 
54 
1 
66 
1 
78 
1 
98 
1 
182 
4 
114 
1 
126 
* 
138 
4 
158 
4 
162 
3 
174 
3 
186 
2 
198 
3 
7 
1 
19 
1 
31 
1 
43 
1 
55 
1 
67 
1 
79 
1 
91 
1 
183 
1 
115 
1 
127 
2 
139 
4 
151 
4 
163 
3 
175 
3 
187 
2 
199 
1 
8 
1 
28 
1 
32 
1 
44 
1 
56 
1 
68 
1 
88 
1 
92 
1 
184 
4 
116 
1 
128 
1 
148 
4 
152 
4 
164 
3 
176 
3 
188 
4 
9 
1 
21 
1' 
33 
1 
45 
1 
57 
1 
69 
1 
81 
1 
93 
1 
185 
1 
117 
1 
129 
4 
141 
4 
153 
4 
165 
3 
177 
4 
189 
4 
18 
1 
22 
1 
34 
1 
46 
1 
58 
1 
78 
1 
82 
1 
94 
1 
186 
1 
U S 
1 
138 
4 
142 
4 
t54 
4 
166 
3 
178 
4 
198 
2 
11 
1 
23 
1 
35 
1 
47 
1 
59 
1 
71 
1 
83 
1 
95 
1 
187 
1 
119 
1 
131 
4 
143 
4 
195 
4 
167 
3 
179 
4 
191 
2 
12 
1 
24 
1 
36 
1 
48 
1 
68 
1 
72 
1 
84 
1 
96 
1 
188 
1 
128 
1 
132 
4 
144 
4 
156 
4 
168 
3 
188 
1 
192 
4 
Fig, 10. TREECH output for the HPI8 teott tr«8. 
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GATE 
1 M 0 
1 M 1 
1 M 2 
1 M 3 
1 M 4 
I M S 
I M C 
1 M 7 
1 M 8 
1 M 9 
1010 
1*11 
1*12 
1*13 
1*14 
1*15 
1*1« 
1017 
1*18 
1019 
1020 
1621 
1*22 
1*23 
1*24 
1025 
1*26 
1*27 
1028 
1*29 
1030 
1*31 
1032 
1033 
1034 
1035 
1036 
1037 
1038 
1039 
1040 
1041 
1042 
1043 
1044 
1045 
104« 
1047 
1048 
1049 
1050 
1051 
1052 
105 J 
1054 
1055 
105« 
1057 
1058 
1059 
1060 
1061 
1062 
1063 
1064 
1070 
1071 
1072 
•tcs 
248832 
2 
48 
4 
1 
48 
2 
1 
2 
12 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
81 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
8 
4 
2 
1 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
2 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
•MX LEW 
174 
4 
43 
22 
4 
40 
10 
3 
9 
25 
5 
6 
4 
5 
11 
5 
5 
6 
6 
4 
5 
82 
23 
21 
19 
19 
20 
23 
20 
21 
19 
18 
19 
19 
19 
19 
23 
7 
4 
12 
6 
1 
4 
4 
6 
6 
14 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
9 
9 
9 
6 
4 
6 
5 
3 
9 
6 
9 
16 
7 
10 
9 
Hf. f I. TRCECH output for th« DIM! of th« HPB fault tr««. 
- 34 -
R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF 
FILE DSK»: HPIS 
SVSTEH: HPIS 
HIGHEST ORDER MANTED > 999 
TOR GATE liaa 
FACTORIZE 
FACTOR IZE 
FACTORIZE 
EVALUATE 
NINiniZE 
MINiniZE 
OVERFLOW 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF HPIS 
REDUCED CUTSET: 
1 SETS OF ORDER 1 
•3. SETS OF ORDER 2 
8 SETS OF ORDER 3 
52. 
EVALUATED CUTSET: 
29 SETS OF ORDER 1 
400 SETS OF ORDER 2 
r?se. SETS OF ORDER 2 
31T9 
Fig. 12. Taletypa output during calculation of minimal cut acta of tha 
HPIS fault tree. 
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CUTSET OF r iPIS 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
-J 
- i 
-1 
-1 
•1 
-1 
. i 
•1 
-1 
-1 
- 1 
1 
-2 
-1 
-i 
- 1 
-1 
-i 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-i 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
999 
99$ 
997 
996 
995 
994 
3?: 
992 
?n 
990 
??? 
98 J 
937 
95 e 
9S5 
9*4 
951 
932 
931 
93* 
979 
973 
977 
976 
975 
974 
971 
972 
971 
97* 
969 
963 
967 
966 
965 
964 
963 
962 
961 
96* 
959 
953 
957 
956 
955 
954 
952 
952 
951 
958 
949 
948 
947 
946 
945 
944 
943 
942 
941 
940 
939 
938 
937 
93« 
935 
31 
-.c 
\VS 
i#7 
37 
52 
6? 
73. 
7 7 
32 
61 
65 
59 
li; 
13 5 
" 'i 
44 
49 
54 
115 
112 
126 
14 
137 
160 
1 
2 j 
J7 
103 
110 
89 
94 
71 
75 
79 
84 
63 
67 
185 
136 
41 
46 
51 
56 
117 
137 
102 
139 
162 
1 
972 
972 
106 
970 
91 
96 
967 
966 
31 
36 
963 
962 
43 
48 
53 
31 
3 6 
101 
10? 
33 
93 
70 
74 
73 
33 
62 
€C 
6ø 
134 
136 
4ø 
45 
50 
55 
116 
113 
127 
100 
133 
161 
a. 
24 
33 
105 
111 
90 
95 
72 
76 
3ø 
35 
64 
63 
191 
190 
42 
47 
52 
57 
118 
973 
104 
140 
163 
4 
999 
993 
971 
996 
130 
97 
993 
992 
965 
964 
989 
983 
959 
958 
957 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4" 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4. 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4' 
4 
4 
4 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
* • * 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
-1 
934 
933 
932 
931 
930 
929 
928 
927 
926 
925 
924 
923 
922 
921 
920 
919 
913 
917 
;ie 
915 
914 
913 
912 
911 
91ø 
9ø9 
90S 
907 
996 
905 
904 
S 03 
9H>2 
901 
9øø 
899 
898 
397 
396 
895 
894 
893 
892 
891 
896 
389 
338 
337 
886 
885 
884 
883 
832 
881 
830 
879 
873 
877 
876 
875 
874 
873 
372 
871 
870 
869 
53 
119 
120 
109 
141 
164 
5 
947 
945 
93 
941 
94ø 
937 
936 
935 
934 
933 
122 
130 
143 
166 
i 
926 
925 
918 
124 
132 
149 
163 
9 
911 
909 
146 
151 
179 
11 
904 
903 
148 
153 
172 
172 
13 
178 
178 
155 
155 
174 
943 
927 
16 
891 
157 
176 
18 
383 
159 
193 
2ø 
8i9 
378 
877 
22 
875 
374 
373 
956 
181 
121 
129 
142 
165 
6 
997 
969 
182 
991 
999 
934 
983 
982 
981 
955 
123 
131 
145 
167 
S 
995 
944 
989 
125 
144 
150 
169 
10 
968 
917 
147 
152 
171 
12 
994 
922 
177 
154 
173 
173 
15 
179 
179 
156 
156 
175 
949 
946 
17 
896 
158 
194 
19 
902 
882 
881 
21 
998 
889 
887 
23 
916 
395 
894 
Fif. 13. Rtsult fil« for th« HPIS fault trtt. 
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4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
333 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
-1 
-1 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-1 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
-i 
834 
128 
128 
12$ 
123 
128 
183 
183 
183 
183 
184 
184 
184 
188 
183 
188 
188 
188 
18? 
183 
189 
189 
192 
192 
192 
192 
192 
193 
193 
89? 
se? 
ser 866 
865 
364 
363 
862 
861 
36* 
35? 
853 
357 
356 
355 
854 
353 
352 
351 
358 
349 
343 
84? 
346 
845 
344 
843 
842 
341 
849 
839 
333 
327 
336 
835 
834 
192 
193 
196 
198 
849 
184 
188 
919 
921 
189 
928 
922 
189 
928 
922 
924 
942 
919 
921 
923 
943 
198 
848 
897 
912 
954 
198 
848 
979 
24 
371 
379 
369 
26 
867 
366 
865 
23 
363 
862 
861 
3* 
353 
357 
856 
355 
854 
853 
852 
851 
858 
847 
346 
345 
344 
84J 
342 
841 
348 
83? 
833 
337 
336 
335 
25 
931 
981 
988 
27 
353 
987 
386 
29 
977 
915 
914 
368 
338 
929 
86.4 
952 
951 
368 
976 
975 
872 
376 
338 
334 
885 
836 
892 
399 
385 
313 
923 
95C 
974 
987 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
4, 
2 
4. 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
398 
918 
919 
921 
923 
938 
938 
939 
942 
954 
968 
968 
961 
985 
114 
19« 
19? 
198 
198 
198 
199 
848 
312 
954 
92« 
922 
924 
939 
961 
968 
943 
979 
961 
986 
985 
986 
89? 
848 
849 
848 
848 
849 
848 
849 
91« 
859 
839 
849 
859 
859 
849 
859 
f i f . t i . Result fil« tor tb« HPB fault t rm. 
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r*£-
5 1 i'> 
~ " T A * »•> 
— - - A ^ * - * -
" 1 2 ? 009 •» ••• 
4 3 :• ? A * 1 4> 
*F I 2 1 0 0 T"-4 
T" • 3 M 5 
.*.: 2 1 !ø 
S 2 2 9 ø«9 4* 
? • 3 • 2 9 0« * 4:-. 
1*.3- 2- l 5 
1 1 2 
12 3. 
13-3 
14 3 
15 ,3 , 
1€ 3 
i r 3 
15 3 
1? 3 
29- 2 
21 .2 
22 Z 
23 2 
24. 3 
25 . 3 
2€ 2 
27-2 
2 6 2 
29 2 
:e-3 
3 1 2 
22. 2 
3 2-2 
24.2 
25 .3 
2€ .2 
~. '• 2 
2S-2 
29-2 
4ø. 2 
41 .3 
42-2 
43-3 
44-2 
45-3 
2-1 -5 
2 5 -S 
2 1 5 
2 ? 00? 4 } 
2- * Øø?-48 
2, 1 - * 
2 5 -S 
2 - 1 5 
2-5 .« 
2-5 -2 
2-5 S 
2 - 1 0 " 
2 10 200 
2 1 5 
2 - l ø 2 
2 5 . S 
2 9 009 48 
2 9 009 4* 
£ 1 -5 
2 -5 S 
2 - l ø 3 
2 5 S 
2 l ø .2 
2 5 * 
2 5 i 
2 0 5 . « 
2. 10 . ; 
M 70 
2 l ø JØ 
2 5 S 
2 l ø 3 
2-5 8 
2 - 1 0 2 
2 1 5 
2 9 øø9 4? 
4fc. 2 2 ? 009 4?. 
47. 3 2 1 . 5-
4 3 . 2 - 2 5 •* 
4 9 . 2 - 2 . 1 0 3 
5ø. 2. 2 -5 's 
51 3 2 10 -3 
5 2 - 2 - 2 . 1 -5 
53. 3 2 « øø«. 4* 
54 .3 - 2. 9 0 * 3 . * * 
55. 2, 2 1 . 5 
5«. 2 . 2 . 5 . 5 
57 2. 2 - l ø 2 
0 
Plc. 14. Failara data for tba comaonanta of tlia Oraatfan-3 ayatøm. 
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UNAVAILABILITY CALCULATION FOR FAULT TREE: 
CALCULATION BASED ON CUTSET 
DRESD3 
NO OF MINIMAL SETS 48 
TIME UNAVAILABILITY 
168 
336. 
584 
672 
840 
10*8 
1176. 
1344. 
1512. 
1636 
3260. 
5040 
672« 
8400 
10079 
11760 
13440 
15119 
16799 
000 
000 
øøø 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
øøø 
000 
000 
000 
øøø 
957 
002 
001 
999 
998 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
91181E-09 
13236E-07 
64278E-07 
19802E-06 
47404E-06 
96711E-06 
17660E-05 
29737E-05 
47047E-05 
70868E-05 
10227E-03 
47188E-03 
13669E-02 
30724E-02 
58895E-02 
10125E-01 
16087E-01 
24680E-01 
34408E-01 
ø 
0 
0 
0 
0. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0. 
0 
0. 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
91177E-09 
13233E-07 
54253E-07 
19788E-06 
47355E-06 
96568E-06 
17625E-05 
29660E-05 
46894E-05 
70585E-05 
10070E-03 
45615E-03 
12880E-02 
28014E-02 
51565E-02 
84411E-02 
12650E-01 
17669E-01 
2325SE-01 
Fig. I S. Unavailability of the Dresden-3 system. 
Two inclusion-exclusion terms. 
Non-repairable case. 
UNAVAILABILITY CALCULATION FOR FAULT TREE 
CALCULATION BASED ON CUTSET 
DRES03 
NO OF MINIMAL SETS 48 
TIME UNAVAILABILITY 
0 
200 
400 
600 
800 
000 
000 
000 
000 
000 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
øøøøøE+øø 
42631E-10 
66085E-10 
65433E-18 
65638E-18 
0 
0 
0 
0 
if 
øøøøøE*øø 
42621E-10 
66885E-10 
6543JE-10 
65638E-10 
Fig. 16, Unavailability of the Dresden-3 system. Repairable case. 
Two inclusion-exclusion terms. 
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OUT 
11 
16 - • 
Pig. 17. Unl-directional network (Uken from reference 22) uaed to 
iUuatrate the TIENET program. 
NBBEX2 
-1 .26,21 
-2 . 26, 21 
-2,26/22 
- ' , 2 1 , 2 3 
-5-21,23 
-6,22,23 
-7 ,23,24 
- 8 , 2 3 , 2 4 
-9 ,24 ,23 
-18,23,25 
-11,25,27 
-12 25,27 
-13,25,27 
-14,23,2« 
-15,26,27 
-16,26,27 
0 
Fig. 18. Input data file to TIENET. Data correspond* to the network 
in fig. 17. 
COMPONENT LIST 
COMPO-
NENT 
INPUT 
NODE 
OUTPUT 
NODE 
NEXT 
COMPONENT 
DESCRIPTION 
NODE LIST 
I 
I 
J 
NOOE N 
PREVIOUS 
NODE 
IIPREV) 
T 
I 
J 
POINTER 
FLAG 
(IFLAGI 
PREVIOUS NODE IN PATH 
T" 
I 
L. 
COMPO-
NENT 
POINTER 
1 
COMPO-
NENT 
POINTER 
2 
T 
~ l 
COMPO-
NENT 
POINTER 
N 
i 
NEXT 
NODE 
OESCR. 
c 
Fig. 1 9. Internal lists in TIENET. 
- 41 -
Start 
I 
ITHIS s O 
NEXT:START NODE 
Look up node 
description for 
NEXT in node list 
found at IPT 
create reference 
to previous node 
IPREV r ITHIS 
ITHIS = IPT 
NX: IFLAG* 1 
IFLAG: NX 
find component 
description ac-
cording to com-
ponent pointer 
number IFLAG 
NEXT: output 
node in com-
ponent des-
cription 
ITHIS : pointer to 
description of 
node under con-
sideration 
NEXT : node under con-
sideration 
IPT : pointer to node 
description 
output path 
by tracing 
back in lists 
Look up node 
description 
at IPT 
IFLAG : 0 IPT : ITHIS 
ITWS : IPREV 
finish! 
connect all 
paths as a 
tree 
Fig, 20, Flowchart for TIENET, 
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NBBEX2 
xieee 
+ 1062 
*iøø3 
-»1004 
• 1005 
+ 1006 
• 1007 
+1008 
• 1009 
• lølø 
• 1011 
• 1012 
• 1013 
• 1014 
• 1015 
+1016 
• 1017 
• 1018 
• 1019 
• 1020 
+1021 
• 1022 
• 1023 
• 1024 
+1025 
+ 1026 
+ 1027 
+ 1028 
+ 1029 
+ 1030 
• 1021 
+1032 
+1033 
+1034 
• 1035 
• 1036 
• 1037 
• 1038 
• 1039 
• 1040 
+ 1041 
• 1042 
+1043 
+ 1044 
+ 1045 
+ 1046 
• 1047 
• 1048 
+ 1049 
• 1050 
• 1051 
+ 1052 
• 1053 
• 1054 
• 1055 
• 1056 
Xløøl 
XI05 7 
X1058 
X1059 
X1060 
X1061 
* 
lløøl 
5 1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
7 
8 
3 
8 
10 
10 
10 
14 
14 
7 
7. 
7 
8 
3 
8 
18 
10 
10 
14 
14 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
ie 
10 
18 
14 
14 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
10 
18 
10 
14 
14 
7 
7 
7 
8 
8 
8 
10 
ie 
10 
14 
14 
9 j 
9 
9 
9 
11 
12 
II 
15 
16 
9 
9 
9 
9 
11 
12 
13 
15 
16 
9 
9 $ 
9 
11 
12 
12 
15 
16 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
11 
12 
13 
15 
16 
9 
9 
9 
9 
9 
11 
12 
13 
15 
16 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
ir 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
12 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
13 
11 
12 
13 
101002100310041005100610071008100910101057 
101011101210131014101510161017101810191058 
101020102110221023102410251026102710281059 
101029103010311032103310341035103610371060 
101038103910401041104210431044104510461061 
101047104810491058105110521053105410551056 
Fig. 21. Output file from TIENET. The data correspond« to the network 
in fig. 17. 
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R CUTSET 
CUTSET OK TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF 
FILE DSKO: P20T2? 
SVSTEH NB8EX2 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED « 999 
TOP SATE: 
GATE l M « SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORIZE 
EVALUATE 
RINIHIZE 
MNIHIZE 
HINIHIZE 
NINIHIZE 
MNIHIZE 
H1MHIZE 
H1NIIH2E 
HIMIHIZE 
MNIRIZE 
niHINIZE 
RINIHIZE 
nminiZE 
M N I H I Z E 
RINIHIZE 
RIMIHIZE 
OVERFLOW 
REOUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF NBBEX2 
REDUCED CUTSET 
3. SETS OF ORDER 3 
3. SETS OF ORDER 4 
2 SETS OF ORDER S 
8 
EVALUATED CUTSET 
5 SETS OF ORDER 3 
3 SETS OF ORDER 4 
2 SETS OF ORDER 5 
18 
CUTSET OF NBBEX2 
4 
-996 
3 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
-1 
L 
4 
9 
7 
9 
11 
7 
11 
999 
2 
5 
1« 
8 
1« 
12 
8 
12 
3 
999 
999 
14 
10 
15 
13 
10 
13 
« 
14 
16 
14 
15 
15 
Fig. 22. Minimal cut aeta for the network In fig, 17. 
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Fig. 24. Bi-directional network (taken from reference 20) uaed to 
illuatrate the TIENET program. 
TYPE JBFlGi. Oft 
JBFIG1 
18,1,3 
11,3,4 
12.4,7 
13,7,8 
14,1,2 
13,2-5 
16, 5- 6 
17,6,8 
16,3,5 
19- 5- 7 
e 
Fig. 25. TIENET input data for the network in fig. 24. 
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R TIENET 
NETWORK PATHS 
OUTPUT MOOES-COMPONENTS OB BOTH- WOOES 
NETWRK FILE 
FILE OSM JBF1G1 
CALCULATE PATHS FROM HOT« 1 
TO NOOE 8 
OUTPUT ON 
FILE OSKf HWTerS 
R TIENET 
NETWORK PATHS 
OUTPUT MOOES, COMPONENTS OR BOTH? COMPONENTS 
NETNRK FILE 
FILE DSK* JBFIG1 
CALCULATE PATHS FROM MODE 1 
TO NOOE 8 
OUTPUT ON 
FILE OSK* C01T08 
R TIENET 
NETWORK PATHS 
QUTPUT MOOES, COMPONENTS OR BOTH? BOTH 
NETWRK FILE 
FILE DSK* JBFIG1 
CALCULATE PATHS FROM NODE 1 
TO NOOE 8 
OUTPUT ON 
FILE DSKR B*lTeS 
CUTSET 
R CUTSET 
CUTSET Oft TIESET 
CUTSET OF 
FILE frSK* N M I W 
SYSTEM: JBFI61 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED - 999 
TOP GATE: 
GATE 1*M SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORI2E 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOW 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF JBFI61 
REDUCED CUTSET: 
1 SETS OF ORDER 
3 SETS OF ORDER 
EVALUATED CUTSET: 
2. SETS OF 
S. SETS OF 
ORDER 
ORDER 
R CUTEV 
EVALUATE COMPLEX EVENTS 
TVPE EVfcl OH 
CUTSET OF JBFIS1 
Fig. 26. Teletype output during- three runs of 
TIENET for the network in Of. 24. 
Fif. 27. Minimal cut acts of the network in 
Ag. 24. Node* only. 
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R CUTSET 
CUTSET Olt TIESET CUTSET 
CUTSET OF: 
FILE DSKt. cenes 
SVSTEH JBFIG1 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED « 999 
TOP 6ATE: 
GflTE: !•— SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORIZC 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOW 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF JBFIG1 
REDUCED CUTSET 
2 SETS OF 
2 SETS OF 
2 SETS OF 
6. 
EVALUATED CUTSET 
4 SETS OF 
8 SETS OF 
4 SETS OF 
16. 
R CUTEV 
EVALUATE COMPLEX 
TYPE EVAL DA 
EVENTS 
CUTSET 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
10 
le 
13 
13 
12 
12 
11 
11 
12 
12 
11 
11 
ie 
le 
13 
13 
15 
14 
17 
16 
15 
14 
15 
14 
17 
16 
17 
16 
17 
16 
15 
14 
ORDER 2 
ORDER 3 
ORDER 4 
ORDER 2 
ORDER 3 
ORDER 4 
18 
18 
18 
18 
19 
1» 
19 
19 
18 19 
18 19 
18 19 
18 19 
Fig. 28. Minimal cut set« of the network in tig. 24. Componenu only. 
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R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TJFSET; CUTSET 
CUTStT OF: 
FILE DSK»: 8811*? 
SVSTEN. JBFIG1 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED • 999 
TOP GATE: 
GATE: SeM SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORIZE 
EVALUATE 
MINIMIZE 
MINIMIZE 
OVERFLOW 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF JBFIG1 
REDUCED CUTSET: 
i SETS OF ORDER 1 
9. SETS OF ORDER 2 
4 SETS OF ORDER 3 
2. SETS OF ORDER 4 
16. 
EVALUATED 
2. 
19. 
24. 
6. 
CUTSET: 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
SETS OF 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
ORDER 
1 
2 
3 
4 
51. 
R CUTEV 
EVALUATE COMPLEX EVENTS 
TYPE 
CUTSET 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
EVftl . l>A 
OF JBFIOl 
8 
1 
j 
I 
3 
2 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
7 
7 
6 
ie 
le 
2 
13 
13 
6 
3 
3 
3 
7 
7 
2 
11 
11 
2 
12 
4 
12 
4 
2 
2 
11 
11 
6 
12 
4 
12 
4 
6 
4 
1« 
ie 
6 
13 
13 
2 
5 
14 
15 
3 
7 
le 
13 
li 
12 
5 
16 
17 
7 
14 
15 
10 
16 
17 
13 
16 
17 
6 
14 
15 
7 
14 
15 
11 
14 
14 
15 
15 
12 
4 
16 
17 
11 
16 
16 
17 
17 
12 
6 
16 
17 
10 
14 
15 
13 
19 
19 
19 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
18 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
19 
18 19 
18 19 
18 19 
18 19 
18 19 
18 19 
Fig. 29. Minimal cut aet« of the network in fig. 24. Node« and components. 
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R CUTSET 
CUTSET OR TIESET: TIESET 
TIESET OF: 
PILE DSK»: C01T03 
SVSTEH: JBFIG1 
HIGHEST ORDER WANTED » 999 
TOP GATE: 
GATE: 199« SELECTED AS TOP 
FACTORIZE 
EVALUATE 
HINIHIZE 
OVERFLOM 
REDUCE 
OUTPUT 
RESULT OF JBFIG1 
REDUCED TIESET. 
1. SETS OF ORDER 2 
3. SETS OF ORDER 3 
3. SETS OF ORDER • 
7. 
EVALUATED TIESET: 
5. SETS OF ORDER 4 
2. SETS OF ORDER 6 
7. 
R CUTEV 
EVALUATE COHPLEX EVENTS 
TYPE EVAL C-A 
TIESET OF JBF1G1 
6 
6 
14 
ie 
le 
13 
•10 
10 
11 
15 
11 
16 
14 
13 
11 
12 
1« 
12 
17 
15 
19 
12 
13 
17 
13 
18 
19 
19 
16 
14 
17 
13 
1» 
18 
Fig. 30. Minimal path aata of tha natworic in fig. 24. Component« only. 
